Monday, February 27, 2012

Climate Change Liability in England, Germany, Poland and Russia

Climate Change Compensation Laws of
the U.K., Germany, Poland and Russia.
England could be an interesting jurisdiction while Germany, Poland and Russia present difficulties with Climate litigation cases according to a book released at the end of 2011, right in time for the Durban summit.

The book we continues to discuss is “Climate Change Liability – Transnational Law and Practive”, edited by Richard Lord, Silke Goldberg, Lavanya Rajamani and Jutta Brunée, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, ISBN 978-1-107-67366-3.

To our knowledge, this is the first book comparing the law of different national systems under the aspect of climate change liability, the major topic of this blog. It has been written by more than 40 authors and is of good average quality. Accordingly, we present the content of this book quite in detail. When doing so, we focus on one of the two types of liability: private liability (discarding public liability). We summarize the various contributions in a view of indicating the chances of victims of climate change to sue successfully polluters. For some of the states examined in the book, our summary is very short, regardless of the length of the original text.

The first blog touched on general conclusions of this detailed investigation of climate change litigation. The second blog post presented the legal situation in Australia, China, India, Indonesia and Japan. The third blog talked about the African region detailing Egypt, Israel, Kenya and South Africa. The fourth blog entry dealt with Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the United States. This blog entry finalizes the series with England, Germany, Poland and Russia.

England

Nuisance: “A condition or activity which unduly interferes with the use of enjoyment of land” may justify a claim for nuisance (460). In the context of nuisance in British law it has to be examined whether:
  • the claimant has suffered a damage of life, health or property (461, 462);
  • there is causality between the defendant's activities and the damage (462);
  • whether these activities could amount to a nuisance by being at least annoyance or inconvenience (461, 462);
  • Whether a defense of statutory authority is available (462).


Negligence: Negligence is given if the defendant has breached a duty of care towards the claimant and if this breach has caused a foreseeable damage (462). A first obstacle for stating negligence might consist in the proximity requirement set-up by courts in order to make the “duty” more concrete, proximity being a vague expression and an easy tool for limiting tort claims deemed inappropriate (463). Foreseeability is already given when the type of damage was foreseeable, though not the extent of the damage (471).

Damage: The authors state that a damage in the meaning of negligence or nuisance might not be stated if certain negative effects are compensated by positive effects so as to constitute a “net benefit” (464).

Causation: The authors claim that the classic “but for” test might not be suitable and sufficient in all cases of climate change (466). In cases of “divisible” damage, it might be possible to divide also the causation for a certain damage (466). However, in the case of indivisible extreme weather events this will not work (466). In this case the claimant could argue that climate change has increased the likelihood of an extreme weather event by more than 100% which would create a prevailing likelihood of the individual extreme weather event being caused by climate change (467).

Statutory authority: No “current legislation gives sufficient direct authorization to emissions to prevent an otherwise valid common law claim” (473).

Common and joint liablility: The usual English law approach would make tortfeasors commonly and jointly liable (469). However, in the case of climate change, only a proportionate share approach is practicable, say the authors (469).

Limitation: Limitation might arise “six years of the accrual of the cause of action” or “three years from when … the claimant was or should have been aware of the right to claim” (474).

Litigation costs: Like elsewhere, “the loser pays and the winner recovers”, but a party might request, e.g. in public interest litigation, for a Protective Costs Order (485). “No win no fee” arrangements are and can be combined with an insurance to cover the defendant's costs (485).

Class actions: Class actions are not accepted, but similar tools are available (485).

Forum and applicable law: The chapter on England contains, on pages 483 and 484, explanations on rules determining:
  • whether England can be chosen as a forum, and
  • which law is applicable.

These rules are basically applicable to all Member States of the European Union and certain neighboring countries:
  • If the defendant is residing in the European Union and certain neighboring countries, the forum is determined by Regulation EC/44/2001 and namely Articles 5(3) and 6 thereof. Otherwise, the national (in this case: English) International Private Law provisions apply.
  • The applicable law is determined by the so-called „Rome II“ Regulation EC/864/2007 which gives the victim of an environmental damage a choice between the law where the damage occurred and the law of the country where the event giving rise to the damage occurred.

A conscious use of these rules could, e.g., lead to a situation in which a multinational with a base in one of the EU states can be sued in application of the progressive law of Brazil or India, but without the lengthiness of the respective judicial systems.

Germany

TORT LAW

The authors first analyze § 823 1st paragraph of the Civil Code which provides for compensation in case of damage to certain legally protected goods (such as property and life) provided that “attributable causation” and negligence are given (400).

Causality: Contrary to the case of “acid rain” caused by a multitude of sources for which the Federal Court had denied a concrete causality, they hold that causality between greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions and climate change can be attributed in a linear way to polluters because all particles of gas are distributed evenly in the atmosphere (401). Despite of a potential reversal of the burden of proof (401, 402), it is more difficult to demonstrate causality between the climate change and the individual damage (403). An increase of risk is not recognized as “causality” (403, 404). This is well embedded in a practice according to which courts ask for a rather high likelihood before assuming “proof”; a predominant likelihood is not sufficient (402).

Accountability: Accountability can be denied for those industries, such as the automotive industries, which contribute only indirectly to climate change; they can only be hold liable if they have a special safety duty which they violate (405). The fleet-target in Regulation EC/443/2009 could constitute a standard that creates such a duty (406).

Illegality: Illegality as precondition for § 823 1st paragraph of the Civil Code is to be denied if the GHG emission is based on customary use of land (which is often the case) and if the damage cannot be avoided without measures that are reasonable in terms of cost (406). Furthermore illegality could be denied with reference to operating licenses (407).

Negligence: The latter aspect of license may also lead to the denial of negligence (408). But it would be hard to argue that polluters were unaware of the effects of GHG emissions (408).

PRIVATE NUISANCE

§ 1004 1st paragraph of the Civil Code provides for the possibility to request the cessation of activities that threaten to interfere with the use of one's land (410). However, as GHG is a customary use of land, § 906 2nd paragraph 1st sentence and § 14 1st sentence of the Federal law for protection against emissions prevent the (claim for) injunction (410). Instead the claimant can request protective measures on the emitter’s side unless protective measures would be economically unreasonable (410, 411). If this is not the case, the claimant can request a financial contribution to protective measures on his side, provided that such protective measures are financially reasonable (411, 412). Such a contribution shall be proportionate to the share of the polluter with regard to the overall pollution (412). If protective measures on the victim's side are financially unreasonable, the victim could maybe obtain partial compensation based on § 906 2nd paragraph 12nd sentence (412, 413).

Comment: Though not explicitly stated by the authors, it can be assumed that the compensation to be paid by the polluter is not only partial with regard to the overall damage, but also proportionate to the polluter's share with regard to the emissions. Thus victims cannot obtain full compensation of their damage by suing one of the polluters.

STRICT LIABILITY

§ 1 of the Environmental Liability Act (UmweltHG) provides for strict liability of listed factory operators for damages to persons or objects for legal or illegal emissions including GHG emissions. Scholars debate whether this act is aiming at such distant and cumulative damages as those caused by GHG emissions (413). They furthermore debate the question whether the effect of prevention, which is at least one of the goals of the act, can be reached in the case of GHG emissions given that GHG emissions cannot be (totally) avoided at this point in time (413). The authors claim good arguments and the majority literature view to be on their side (413, 414).

Comment: As the German courts are seldom really impressed by the majority view in literature, it remains pretty much open whether a claim based on § 1 of the Environmental Liability Act would be successful in any of the many courts of Germany. Furthermore it might be difficult if not impossible to obtain a joint an common liability for the overall damage because the exact contribution of each polluter can be estimated. Germany (and Austria) rejects a joint and common liability if the share of one tortfeasor can be estimated, as we stated in another blog entry. Tort law and nuisance law not being easy paths and not leading to a joint and common liability either, Germany cannot be regarded as easy playing field for climate damage compensation claims.

Poland

Tort law: Any faulty causation of a harm might trigger liability under tort law, fault not yet being precisely defined (429). However, liability under tort law can be refuted by the argument that the respective activity is compliant with permits which are themselves compliant with the law (429). The potential effectiveness of such defense could only be weakened by a future court ruling, for example a ruling deeming that actions that contribute to climate change without adequate preventative measures to minimize their negative impact on the atmosphere are illegal (429).

Strict liability: Polish law recognizes a (fault independent) strict liability for “high risk business”, provided that causality between this activity and the damage has been established (431, 432).

Joint and common liability: A joint and common liability can only be assumed if several persons committed prohibited acts which form one single tort, the unity of tort being “determined by its indivisibility” or by the fact that “there can be no distinction of damage for which specific persons are liable“” (433, 434). The authors make no statement on whether this condition is to be regarded as fulfilled in the case of climate change damages, whilst in the chapter on England it was stated that extreme weather events would be regarded as “indivisible” (466). The fact that the tortfeasors are hold liable on different legal principles does not impede joint and common liability (433).

Class actions: Class actions are possible under certain conditions (434).

Preclusion: Preclusion takes place three years, in case of property damage 10 years after the victim noticed the damage (434).

Litigation costs: The losing party has to pay the costs for the lawyer(s) of the winning party, but only up to a level determined by regulation (443).

Comment: Whilst the authors seem to be skeptical as to the success chances, the Polish law still looks comparatively interesting for victims of climate change. First common and joint liability of polluters can be at least argued for. Second there is a strict environmental liability scheme that could be tested in the context of GHG emissions. Third the doctrine on “fault” is still under development. Therefore claimants might find avenues such as accusing certain polluters, and namely the important national fossil power plant operators, of not having taken all available mitigation measures. To our knowledge, fossil power plants in Poland are rather inefficient; and CO2 capture techniques are not used either.

Russia

Neither the civil liability for damage to the environment nor tort law can be successfully used to establish liability for GHG emissions. The first is to be excluded due to the fact that there is no legal obligation for mitigating climate change (496). Tort law is not suitable as courts only recognize close causal links and as courts also require a high standard “for an action to be considered ‘culpabable’” (515).

Info: A free PDF copy of the book is available at the oxfam website:
http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/climate-change-liability-transnational-law-and-practice-191277

Update: We later examined tendancies of climate change laws in Latin American countries starting with Argentina here

Friday, February 24, 2012

Climate Change Liability in Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the United States

Climate Change Legal Framework of
Canada, Brazil, the U.S., and Mexico
(Image Pete Souza).
Brazil has strong environmental laws, but there are few practical cases up till now where these laws have been asserted. In Mexico the laws may not favor compensation because the system requires that a tortfeasor are given a chance to fixes the damages they caused before compensation can be demanded from victims. In Canada the chances may be better than in the U.S. where joint and common liability is unlikely to be affirmed by U.S. courts.

This information comes from a book “Climate Change Liability – Transnational Law and Practice”, edited by Richard Lord, Silke Goldberg, Lavanya Rajamani and Jutta Brunée, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, ISBN 978-1-107-67366-3. This book was released at the end of 2011, just before the Durban summit.

To our knowledge, this is the first book comparing the law of different national systems under the aspect of climate change liability, the major topic of this blog. It has been written by more than 40 authors and is of good average quality. Accordingly, we present the content of this book quite in detail. When doing so, we focus on one of the two types of liability: private liability (discarding public liability). We summarise the various contributions in a view of indicating the chances of victims of climate change to sue successfully polluters. For some of the states examined in the book, our summary is very short, regardless of the length of the original text.

The first blog entry focused on the general conclusions the authors draw from the detailed investigation. The second blog entry presented the chapters on Australia, China, India, Indonesia and Japan. The third blog entry presented the legal situation for Egypt, Israel, Kenya and South Africa. This Fourth blog entry deals with Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the United States.

Brazil

Liability on a non-fault basis: Brazil has a strong non-fault based liability for environmental damages. This liability is enshrined in Article 225 § 3 of the Brazilian Constitution, Article 927 of the Brazilian Civil Code (Código Civil) and Article 4 Section VII and Article 14 § 1 of Law No. 6938 of 1981 (615-617). The practice, however, seems to be different: “As part of the search for an equivalent compensation, the lawsuits turn into long disputes, which do not allow for quick and satisfactory results for the truly disadvantaged, thus favouring the perpetrators of the damage” (618).

Public Civil Actions: Law No. 7347 of 1985 provides for a specific liability tool, aiming at compensation of environmental damages caused by a forbidden act or omission (619, 620).

Canada

Negligence: Negligence is given if harm was caused as a result of unreasonable acts or omissions (543). The defendant must have had a duty of care to the plaintiff (543). The harm must have been reasonably foreseeable; this is the case when the defendant should have had “the plaintiff in contemplation as being affected” (543). In this context, the courts apply a criterion of proximity: “is the relationship one where the imposition of legal liability for the wrongdoer's actions is appropriate?” (544, FN 81). The plaintiff may argue that the case falls under an existing type of negligence to demonstrate proximity (544). S/he may also argue that a new type of negligence should be recognised (544). The categories of negligence are not limited, thus new types can be developed (543). However, the authors state that establishing proximity “would likely be a crucial challenge”.
The defendant must have failed to fulfil this duty (543) or standard of care (544). The standard of care is based on what can be expected from “an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person in the same circumstances”. The standard of care is influenced by the likelihood of a known or foreseeable harm, the gravity of the harm and the effort needed to prevent the harm (545).

Conspiracy: Conspiracy is given if there is (1) an agreement between several persons, (2) an unlawful activity, (3) a damage and (4) either an intent or a known likelihood of the damage to occur (545). Conspiracy can give rise to punitive damages (545).

Private nuisance: Private nuisance is defined as “the unreasonable interference with the use of land” and does not require a duty of care and negligence in general (546).

Strict liability: Strict liability refers to the “non-natural use of land” which causes the escape of something that causes harm and is regarded as a flexible concept (546).

Provincial legislation: Some provinces ban the release of substances that cause damage to the environment unless they are authorised (552). For substantial non-authorised GHG emissions, this offers another pathway (552).

Causation: Beyond the classic causality (factual causation or “but-for”- test), Canadian courts recognize the “material contribution test”. They assume causality if it is impossible for the plaintiff to prove causation in the normal way, whereas the damage is “within the ambit of the risk created by the defendant's breach of the defendant's duty of care to the plaintiff” (547, 548).

Joint and common liability: It is unclear whether Canadian courts would assume a joint and several liability or whether they would follow the U.S. Market share doctrine (548, 549).

Limitation: Provinces have set-up different time limitations (549).

Comment: Chances to get compensation seem at least to be better than in the U.S.

Mexico

Mexican law recognises both fault liability and strict liability, the latter being linked to a dangerous activity (637). The author regards it as difficult to prove the causality chain between a certain human behaviour and climate change and between climate change and the individual damage (639). Furthermore, limitation issues would make it difficult for plaintiffs (640). Compensation can only be requested if restoration is impossible (641).

United States

Public nuisance: Public nuisance is given where there is an “unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public” (580), a test which is “infamously malleable” and thus giving rise to a case-by-case decision making practice (580). The infringed right must be public, but the harm has to be individualised (580). No fault is required (580). Instead of giving much indication on the various substantial questions which could be raised in this context, the authors describe primarily the 4 famous climate litigation cases of the U.S. history so far, and most prominently the case AEP v. Connecticut. In that case, the Supreme Court hold that the Clean Air Act provides the Environmental Protection Agency EPA with the power to regulate GHG and “that the EPA was exercising that authority” (583). “This displaced the federal common law of nuisance” (583). By a 4:4 decision, the court rejected the argument that some of the plaintiffs might have a State status which would allow to challenge EPA's refusal to regulate GHG (584); the 9th judge was recused (583). The authors claim that this 4:4 decision might not be the end of the story for state public nuisance claims against GHG emissions; but “there might be a 5-4 majority against any kinds of GHG nuisance claims (and maybe other kinds of GHG claims) by non-states” (584). Furthermore the judges left the question open whether the public nuisance law of one of the U.S. states is precluded as well (584), wherefore plaintiffs might forum shop (look for the most appropriate place) both in a view of the state laws and the various court districts or “circuits” (585). Preclusion of public nuisance by an authorising state law has been confirmed, in a non-GHG case, in a decision of the Fourth Circuit (585); and “On 17 June 2011, Governor Rick Perry of Texas signed a Bill providing that companies sued for nuisance or trespass for GHG emissions would have an affirmative defence if those companies were in substantial compliance with their environmental permits” (585; State Bill 875 to be codified at Tex. Water Code Ann. § 7.257).

Whilst injunctive claims in the U.S. might now shift (and why not?) to the undergrowth of the different states, the door of nuisance claims at federal level might get opened again if the Congress was to reduce EPA's competence for GHG without banning federal common law nuisance claims (586). Furthermore, and this is most important for this blog, the question is still open whether compensation claims are bared in the same way as injunctive claims (586). This question might pop-up soon with “Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil” which was put on hold due to the AEP case. The newly filed “Comer v. Murphy Oil” might provide for another occasion to decide on this question (586).

Both injunctive and climate damage compensation claims raise a broad range of further questions on which no statement can be made so far, amongst them:
  • Is there a preclusion by the “Political question doctrine” (590, 592)?
  • How would causality be interpreted, given that there is a multitude of GHG emitters (586, 591, 592)?
  • What would be the appropriate share for each plaintiff and each defendant (586, 591)?
Comment: To judge from these lines, from other publications on the U.S. and from the general trend in most if not all Anglo-Saxon/common law countries, a joint and common liability for GHG emissions is unlikely to be stated by U.S. courts. If this assumption was to be right and if the authors are right in pointing to the many open questions, we might be tempted to conclude that quite some non-U.S. Jurisdictions, and even those of the two neighbours of the U.S.; could offer more interesting opportunities than the U.S. jurisdiction(s). This conclusion might even be valid for victims of climate change in the U.S. They are not bared from suing CO2 polluters in the most promising countries of the European Union.

Info: A free PDF copy of the book is available at the oxfam website:
http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/climate-change-liability-transnational-law-and-practice-191277

Update: A deeper examination of Latin American countries can be found here starting with Argentina

Sunday, February 19, 2012

Climate Change Liability in Egypt, Israel, Kenya and South Africa

Climate change liability
in select African states
(image by Tomas Castelazo). 
In Part 3 of the continuing book review, the selected areas in Africa discussed generally do no present good legal conditions for climate change compensation and litigation law suits. Neither South Africa nor Israel have common liability so the amount of the compensation may not be as high as other jurisdictions. However Israel offers some nicer conditions for victims because corporations are required to take due care. Egypt does not have material increase in risk. The likelihood in Kenya to win such a case is also low.

Climate Change Liability – Transnational Law and Practive“, edited by Richard Lord, Silke Goldberg, Lavanya Rajamani and Jutta Brunée, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, ISBN 978-1-107-67366-3.

This book was published at the end of 2011, right in time for the Durban summit, and to our knowledge, this is the first book comparing the law of different national systems under the aspect of climate change liability, the major topic of this blog. It has been written by more than 40 authors and is of good average quality. Accordingly, we present the content of this book quite in detail. When doing so, we focus on one of the two types of liability: private liability (discarding public liability). We summarize the various contributions in a view of indicating the chances of victims of climate change to sue successfully polluters. For some of the states examined in the book, our summary is very short, regardless of the length of the original text.

The first blog entry focused on the general conclusions the authors draw from the detailed investigation. The second blog entry presented the chapters on Australia, China, India, Indonesia and Japan. This blog entry presents the legal situation for Egypt, Israel, Kenya and South Africa.

Egypt

Liability on a fault basis: To obtain compensation via Article 163 of the Egyptian Civil Code (ECC), the claimant has to establish fault, a fault being “a breach of a legal obligation to observe due care towards others, by deviating from the behavior of the reasonable man” (261). In the view of the authors, emitting greenhouse gas (GHG) can hardly be regarded as a fault given that the environmental law does not forbid it and given that Egypt is a non-Annex I country (262).

Liability on a non-fault basis: Article 178 of the Egyptian Civil Code establishes the responsibility of the guardian of things which require special care (262). The guardian may prove that the damage has occurred as a result of an alien reason to which he did not contribute (262). The major obstacle identified by the authors in the case of climate change litigation is the fact that “it is difficult to prove that the defendant is primarily responsible for the long-term harm that is caused by many contributors around the world” (263). “Egyptian law does not recognize the concept of 'material increase in risk' or a similar concept” to prove a damage; the damage must be there (263).

Israel

Clean Air Act 2008: GHG fall under the CAA (274). “The CAA prohibits” any natural or legal person “from causing strong or unreasonable air pollution” (274).

Breach of statutory duty: These are the conditions for obtaining compensation (287/288):
  • Breach of a statutory duty (to be assumed in case of violation of the CAA);
  • The statute is intended to protect the plaintiff or the public as a whole (this can be assumed in the case of the CAA);
  • The plaintiff was damaged by the breach (causality);
  • The type of damage suffered by the plaintiff belongs to the damages intended to be prevented;
  • The legislator did not indicate that a breach of the statutory duty should not legitimate civil action (in the case of CAA, the legislator indicated the contrary – private litigation should be possible);
  • The damage must have been foreseeable (see below under negligence).


Negligence: There must have been a duty of care between the particular defendant and the particular plaintiff (289). The causality is established on the basis of the “sine qua non test” or by assuming that the defendant set a “sufficient cause”; the Supreme Court seems to be creative when wishing to compensate victims (291) which may include assuming causality based just on statistical grounds (292, 293). The damage must have been foreseeable which implies that the defendant could see the potential causality between his behavior and the damage; and that he also should have seen this causality (290). The authors assume that there would not be a joint and common liability of tortfeasors in the case of GHG emissions, but just a compensation based on the individual tortfeasor's share (e.g. market share).

Nuisance: Nuisance covers the “interference of one person with another person's enjoyment of his/her land and is therefore too narrow in scope” for covering GHG emissions (286).

Comment: Israel is attractive for cases where a company infringed the CAA. Israel’s jurisprudence on negligence is also quite generous for victims. But the absence of a joint and common liability of all tortfeasors makes Israel much less attractive in general terms.

Kenya

The authors only describe the legal basis for legal action, without really applying the legal basis to the case of climate change compensation claims.

Nuisance: The claimant must prove that there is a continuous interference of the defendant with the claimant's use or enjoyment of land. Furthermore, the must demonstrate that the defendants behaviors was unreasonable (313).

The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher; The authors resume the Rylands v. Fletcher ruling, which is used all across Anglo-Saxon/common law countries, as follows (314): “Where a person for his own purposes brings and keeps on land in his occupation anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, he must keep it at his peril, and if he fails to do so, he is liable for all damage which is a natural consequence of the escape.”

Negligence: The lawsuit is only successful if
  • the defendant had a duty of care towards the plaintiff,
  • has breached this duty and 
  • if this breach has caused the damage of the plaintiff (314). 

Causality can only be assumed “if the defendant's particular acts or omissions were the cause of the loss or damage sustained”; this is likely to be difficult to prove (315).

South-Africa

Regular tort law: Civil liability for tort has, as a rule, the following preconditions:
  • An act or an omission must have caused damage or harm to another person (333);
  • In case of an omission, the court may request that the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant had a legal duty to act (334). Such a duty could derive from the National Environmental Management Act (336) which imposes, in its Section 28, a duty of care on persons causing pollution or degradation of the environment (323);
  • The court must state, in a kind of discretionary decision taking account of societal factors and of the constitution, whether there is “wrongfulness”;
  • The defendant must have acted in awareness of the potential damage = with dolus (337) or, at least, negligently (338). The authors claim that dolus indirectus or dolus eventualis might be given for most defendants in the case of climate change (339).
  • Negligence is given as soon as a reasonable person would foresee the possibility of a harm and would take reasonable steps to prevent this harm and if the defendant failed to take such steps (338);
  • Causality must have been established (340). The authors claim that this will be the major stumbling block;
  • The causality chain shall not be too remote (341).


Product liability: The authors claim that the Consumer Protection Act, establishing a strict liability, could in theory be invoked for climate change compensation claims caused by goods, whether produced in South-Africa or imported (342, 343). However, here again the issues of wrongfulness and of causation arise (342).

Nuisance: Nuisance can be given by “an act or omission that inconveniences another's right of use and enjoyment” and that constitutes an unreasonable and wrongful use of property (343).

Joint and common liability: The South-African law provides for the apportionment of damages in accordance with the Apportionment of Damages Act (340). Thus there is no joint and common liability.

Comment: Though providing for a variety of relatively promising legal paths for climate damage litigation, the South-African law is not ideal for victims of climate change due to the apportionment of damages (no joint and common liability).

Lawyers might nonetheless appreciate reading this chapter in as much as it is sophisticated. Several argumentations such as the one on dolus (instead of mere negligence) are unique and make this chapter particularly instructive.

Info: A free PDF copy of the book is available at the oxfam website:
http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/climate-change-liability-transnational-law-and-practice-191277

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